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RUSSIA AND THE REVERSAL OF ALLIED POLICY

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I. INTRODUCTION

To the student of history and international relations the recent reversal of the allied policy toward Russia is an event of prime significance. It practically marks the abandonment of an ill-advised international program which from the first was doomed to complete failure as a solution of the Russian problem. In adopting a more sane policy, however, the Allied statesmen seem to have been motivated neither by humanitarian considerations nor by a more intelligent conception of the real needs of Russia. Their action appears to be rather one of expediency. Menaced by the spread of Bolshevism to their own domains, threatened by political groups at home and having failed after relentless efforts to destroy the dictatorial Lenine government, they were virtually compelled to adopt a more conciliatory attitude. To the end that the last named of these underlying causes for this change of policy may be made more apparent it is the purpose of this article to show in a brief but comprehensive manner how the Allied policy toward Russia has operated during the past eighteen months. Obviously many details must be omitted; nor is it possible to give the text of important documentary materials which are as yet zealously guarded from the eyes of the world.¹

II. OPPOSITION GOVERNMENTS

After the Bolshevik insurrection in 1917 and the establishment of a dictatorship by the left wing of the revolutionary party, Russian irreconcilables and conservative statesmen the world over repeatedly urged that Bolshevism

be destroyed and that a government of "law and order" be substituted for the Lenine régime. It was not, however, until the summer of 1918 that the advocates of such a program were able to perfect their plans. In their judgment three methods of procedure were possible for the resurrection of revolutionary Russia. (1) To encourage the establishment of anti-Bolshevik governments which would be aided and abetted by the Entente powers. (2) To crush the Bolsheviki by military force. (3) To surround the Soviet republic with a cordon of hostile states and armies, isolated it, and by means of a stringent blockade starve it out of existence. All of these possible solutions were tried.

1. *The government of the north.* The first of many opposition governments set up with only mediocre success was the so-called "government of the north" established under the leadership of the famous revolutionary socialist, Nikolai Tschaikovsky, during the first week of August, 1918, and, incidentally, shortly after the landing of Allied forces at Archangel. This government announced its assumption of power in a proclamation signed by the members of the abortive constituent assembly representing the provinces of Novgorod, Archangel, Vologda, Viatka, Kazau, and Samara. Its political program provided for the regeneration of Russia on a democratic basis, the reestablishment of local self-government with universal suffrage, reorganization of the national army, renewal of the war against Germany, and the repudiation of the famous Brest-Litovsk treaty. Labor unions and war organizations were to be allowed to function freely and local governments were to control the food supply. While the new organization abolished Soviet institutions and ordered the arrest of all Soviet officials, it retained the Bolshevik policy of nationalizing finance and various branches of industry. Naturally the extreme reactionaries were bitterly opposed to such a program and largely as a result of their efforts the Tschaikowsky government on September 8 was overthrown and its leaders expelled from Archangel. Inasmuch as this government had been financed in part by the British and apparently had the support of the Social Revolutionists

and the Menshevik wing of the Social Democrats, the allied diplomatic and military chiefs at Archangel immediately demanded that it be restored to power, a request which was complied with on September 12. The restored government, however, assumed a position subordinate to a government set up in September at Samara on the Volga by two hundred members of the constituent assembly of 1917 which had been dissolved by the Bolsheviki upon the latter's assumption of power. This government, which proposed to assume control of all Russia, was headed by Avksentief, formerly minister of the interior in the Kerensky cabinet, assisted by General Alexieoff, the well known military leader. Its program provided for a federated European Russia and for the continuance of the war against Germany in alliance with the Entente. With the capture of Samara by the Bolsheviki, however, this government ceased to function.

Another and more serious effort to centralize authority and unify action in combating Bolshevism was made late in September when a so-called National Congress assembled at Ufa. In attendance at this meeting were many members of the defunct constituent assembly as well as representatives from Ural, Orenburg, Uralsk, Semirietshensk, Yenieslisk, Astrakhan and other districts; the Cossacks, the Kirghiz Tartars and all political parties except the Bolsheviki also sent delegates. Under the leadership of President Maslov of the Czecho-Slovak National Council, this congress organized an all-Russian provisional government nominally to succeed the Kerensky government of 1917, and as such to have dictatorial power. Plans were made for the summoning of a national constituent assembly which should convene in January, 1919, but in the meantime supreme power over all Russia was to be exercised by a directorate of five members; the convention unanimously elected to this directory Nikolai Avksentief (Socialist) as president; Peter Vologodsk (Socialist), of the Western Government of Siberia, as prime minister; N. Tschaikovsky (Socialist), of the Archangel government; N. Astrov (Cadet), former mayor of Moscow, and General Vassili Boldyrev (non-party) commander-in-chief. According to its program the

Ufa government sought to overthrow the Bolsheviks, reintegrate Russia, repudiate the Brest-Litovsk treaty, restore relations with the Allies and continue the war against Germany. It failed, however, to specify whether the future Russian government was to be republican or monarchical and it was equally ambiguous on the question of land ownership. In contradistinction to the Bolsheviks, it welcomed foreign capital and private initiative in the development of the productive resources of the country. The Ufa government was openly supported by Kerensky, who, on October 10, asked the British government to accord it formal recognition. Great Britain and her allies, however, apparently decided to await further evidences of its ability to act for the Russian nation. Not unnaturally it was vigorously opposed by the Bolsheviks and in October it was forced to seek quarters in Siberia where it joined the government of Omsk and became the fourth which had been set up in that city.

2. *The Omsk government.* Meanwhile anti-radical governments were springing up in Siberia. In May, 1918, General Semenov, an anti-Bolshevik commander, and Admiral Kolchak, a reputed monarchist and former commander of the Black Sea fleet, set up an independent government in eastern Siberia at Lake Baikal. At Harbin, two months later, General Horvath, commander of an anti-Bolshevik Russian force, appointed a provisional war cabinet for all Siberia of which he styled himself prime minister. During the same month still another provisional Siberian government was established at Omsk; like all the other opposition movements, it proposed to overthrow the Bolshevik régime, restore order throughout the country if possible without foreign help, convoke a constituent assembly to be elected on the basis of universal suffrage, distribute land among the landless, insure state control of the nation's economic activities, and establish a labor bureau. This government did not show sufficient ability to command respect for its authority and in consequence was overthrown. It was quickly followed by another which met a similar fate. Not discouraged by the two previous failures, anti-

Bolshevik leaders under the protection of Czecho-Slovak troops made a third and more successful attempt. To the end that the new government might be strengthened and the reactionary elements discouraged, President Avksentief, on November 7, appealed to President Wilson for American and allied recognition and aid; it was to no avail, however, and in less than two weeks Avksentief was imprisoned and the supreme power was in the hands of Admiral Kolchak assisted by General Horvath who announced the *coup d'etat* as a counter-measure against the radical wing of the Omsk government. By this action Kolchak actually eliminated the few remaining liberals of the Omsk organization. The new dictator at once issued a proclamation in which he declared: "I am not about to take the path of reaction or of disastrous party politics, but my chief aim will be the creation of a fighting army, victory over the Bolsheviks and the establishment of justice and order so that the nation may without interference choose for itself the form of government it desires." Kolchak was at first vigorously opposed by General Semenov, the "Napoleon of Siberia," but late in December it was announced that he had agreed to recognize Kolchak if the latter would retire in favor of General Denikin, the leader of the Don Cossacks, as soon as a junction of Cossacks and Siberian forces could be effected. The Kolchak government proved to be more stable than its predecessors, its reputation for establishing "law and order" and the military success which it achieved against the Bolsheviks finally resulting in its conditional recognition by Japan and the Council of Four on June 12, 1919. So promising was the outlook for the continued success of the former admiral that a month later the Allies agreed under certain conditions to assist him in establishing an All-Russian government. Kolchak agreed to hold elections for a constituent assembly as soon as he could reach Moscow, or, if conditions should be too disturbed for such a procedure, then to reconvene the former constituent assembly. He further promised to recognize the independence of Finland and Poland and come to an amicable arrangement with other governments in the terri-

tories of the former Russian empire. The associated countries in turn agreed to supply arms, munition, food and money but not troops.

This arrangement did not fully satisfy the ardent admirers of Kolchak, who were clamoring for full American and Allied recognition of the Omsk organization. Accordingly in July, Roland S. Norris, American ambassador to Japan, and General William S. Graves, Commander in chief of the American forces in Siberia, were delegated by the Peace Conference as a special mission to investigate the strength and permanency of the Kolchak régime. After three weeks of careful study and inquiry, during which time a series of conferences were held at Omsk in conjunction with representatives of the British, French and Japanese governments, Mr. Norris reported in favor of immediate and full recognition for in his opinion such action would have a splendid moral effect upon the population and soldiery of Siberia. In spite of this recommendation the committee found, however, many disintegrating influences at work which, unless eliminated, seemed to foreshadow the collapse of the Kolchak government. On the field of battle the "Resurrector of Russia" had suffered disastrous defeats; his armies in full retreat were disheartened and demoralized; the entire Ural front was in the hands of the Bolsheviki; the Czechoslovaks refused to fight longer on Russian soil; relations with one of his prominent leaders, General Semenov, were strained to the breaking point; by the civil population Kolchak himself was feared and distrusted. In light of these conditions full recognition was postponed indefinitely.

By mid-September, 1919, it was evident that the Omsk government was tottering; striking evidence to this effect was seen when on September 15 it was announced that Ivan Yakushev, president of the first Siberian Duma which had been dissolved by Admiral Kolchak in the fall of 1918, had issued a proclamation for the overthrow of the all-Russian government. After roundly denouncing Kolchak and his coadjutors as "reactionaries" the document proposed that an all-Siberian constituent assembly be convened which should at once proceed to wipe out the existing abuses. It

further enumerated a long list of suggested reforms including local self-government, allotment of land to the peasant, freedom of workmen's unions and military changes. Although Yakushev was unsuccessful, Kolchak's grip rapidly relaxed and it was with increasing difficulty that he managed to keep in check his none too trustworthy subordinates. In Eastern Siberia, for instance, the activities of General Rosanov, the Russian commander, were so drastically criticised by the inter-Allied military chiefs that he was recalled. No sooner was this action taken than a Cossack conference hastily called at Omsk for the purpose submitted a protest to Kolchak bitterly denouncing Rosanov's reprimand. Late in October General Semenov unsuccessfully attempted to seize a trainload of rifles consigned from America to the all-Russian government; again in early November plans were brewing in Vladivostok for a revolt against Kolchak's authority.

Thus faced by rebellion from within and harassed by the incessant onslaughts by the ever-advancing Bolsheviks, the Siberian dictator made desperate but futile efforts to stem the tide. Finally on November 15 his capital fell into the hands of the enemy, his government in the meantime having sought headquarters at Irkutsk. So much opposition was encountered here from the social revolutionary elements that Kolchak under threat of being deposed, reluctantly gave his consent for the formation of a coalition cabinet. The task of forming the new ministry was undertaken by M. Pepelaiev whom Kolchak appointed as premier. Pepelaiev, a constitutional democrat (Cadet), a former member of the fourth duma and a member of Lvov's government during the early days of the revolution was strenuously opposed to both the Bolsheviks and the monarchists. On December 2, after avowing its purpose to continue the struggle against Bolshevism, the newly constituted government announced its principles as follows: (1) emancipation of the civil administration from the political influence of military leaders; (2) curbing of all abuses and acts of injustice no matter by what faction or party they might be committed; (3) reduction of ministerial staff; (4) granting

of increased power to local assemblies; (5) establishment of more friendly relations with the Czecho-Slovaks and with such other groups whose coöperation might be distinctly beneficial.

Several other reform projects were announced including a proposal for a Siberian representative parliament (Sobor). But they failed to quench the smouldering fires of discontent. It was too late for Kolchak or even for a coalition government to prevent the conflagration which burst forth in late December. At this time some 800 radical revolutionaries of the Kolchak army formed a "Committee Government" and took possession of the Irkutsk station on the Trans-Siberian Railroad. In less than a month the revolutionary forces were in complete control; the Pepelaiev government had ceased to function, the Kolchak armies had melted away and Kolchak was himself a prisoner in the hands of the Irkutsk revolutionary committee.

3. *The government of the northwest.* One other government of importance was set up in opposition to the Bolsheviki—the government of northwestern Russia. Organized in August, 1919, soon after the Anti-Bolshevist offensive against Petrograd, it established its capital in the Estonian city of Reval. While it supposedly represented all factions opposed to Bolshevism, its real soul was General Nicholas Yudenitch, an emigré and a thorough-going reactionary. In announcing the birth of the new government, Yudenitch expressly stated that it had been formed "in complete harmony with the plenipotentiary representatives of the Allied powers" and that it was "united with the rest of Russia in the person of the chief executive, Admiral Kolchak." Its declaration of principles contained many interesting features. For instance, it alike condemned Bolshevism and reaction, declared Russian citizens, irrespective of race, nationality or religion, equal before the law, and guaranteed all civil liberties, including inviolability of person and domicile, freedom of the press, speech, assembly, association and strike. Immediately upon the liberation of Russia "from the tryanny of the Bolsheviki," the people were to select an all-Russian constituent assembly on the basis of a

"general, direct, equal and secret vote." If in the meantime the provinces of Petrograd, Pskov and Novgorod should be liberated, their inhabitants should choose a "Territorial Popular assembly" to determine a form of government for these three provinces. The solution of the land problem was left to the constituent assembly, which, however, was to solve it "in accordance with the will of the toiling agricultural population." The labor question was to be settled on the basis of an eight hour day, state control of industry, and full protection of labor and the working class.

There is little doubt that this movement was sponsored by Great Britain, for according to the terms of a compact between the northwestern and the British governments, it appears that the latter agreed to (1) support the northwestern government in every possible way in its struggle against the Bolsheviki and especially in its efforts to occupy Petrograd, (2) supply Yudenitch with munitions and modern weapons of war such as tanks and aeroplanes, (3) exercise pressure upon Germany so as to facilitate recruiting among the Russian prisoners of war still in Germany, (4) furnish supplies, especially food to the districts suffering from the effects of Bolshevik rule, (5) and, lastly, grant a special credit of 1,000,000,000 rubles to purchase machinery and raw materials for the restoration of Russian industry. Great Britain was to withhold this money, however, until after the Lenine government had been overthrown.

This generous support on the part of Great Britain was not to be rendered gratis; in fact the arrangement is typical of modern imperialistic methods. The northwestern government agreed to (1) recognize all of Great Britain's special interests in the Baltic region, (2) give the Baltic countries opportunity to exercise the right of self-determination, (3) declare officially, after the capture of Petrograd, its disinterestness in the Persian question, (4) recognize all the debts of the old Russian government, (5) and forbear making any important purchases in Germany so long as delivery agreements based upon any credit arrangements with Great Britain exist.

The government of the northwest was even less successful than the Omsk organization, for General Yudenitch, after smashing forward to the very doors of Petrograd, was hurled back by the Bolshevik forces, his scattered army falling victim to fever and starvation. This military disaster sapped the life blood of the northwestern government so that to all intents and purposes it became a negligible force in Russian affairs.

III. MILITARY INTERVENTION

The stated reason for Allied military intervention in Russia was three-fold: to crystallize opposition to Germany by accentuating the difference between Allied and Teutonic methods, to aid the Czecho-Slovaks in effecting a passage to France by way of Siberia, and to help the former Russian Empire in establishing internal peace by freeing the country from maleficent alien domination and domestic enemies. Efforts to this end were foreshadowed when in the spring of 1918 small contingents of British and Japanese troops were landed under protest of the Soviet government at Vladivostok upon the pretext of protecting life and property. A few months later Allied forces landed at Murmansk on the Kola peninsula for the avowed purpose of protecting war materials which had been collected there during the Kerensky régime.

For some time there had been considerable agitation in America and in the Allied countries for military intervention on a large scale, but the United States, believing it would result in greater confusion and misunderstanding, was reluctant to accede to such a course, in this decision being supported by the Liberals of the associated countries. During the summer and early autumn of 1918, however, Russian emigrés advised the Allied leaders that comparatively small Allied forces introduced into several Russian ports would have no difficulty in penetrating the country, rallying the people to their support and crushing the hated Bolsheviks. Blindly or unblindly, the Allied diplomats resolved to try this military expedient. Their decision did

not have the unanimous approval of public opinion and apparently in consequence "declarations of intentions" were issued by the United States and several of the Allied governments. The American government declared that the "only present object" for which troops would be employed would be to guard military stores and to render such aid as might be acceptable to the Russian people in the organization of their own self-defense. It emphatically stated that the United States did not contemplate interference with the political sovereignty of Russia nor intervention in her internal affairs. On August 8 the British government issued a declaration similar to that of the American government stating that "we wish to solemnly assure you that while our troops are entering Russia to assist you in your struggle against Germany, we shall not retain one foot of your territory," and that it was for the Russian people "to decide their form of government and to find solution for their social problems." Like assurances given by the Japanese government were concurred in by the other Allies.

In the meantime Allied troops which had landed at Archangel on the south shore of the White Sea, were soon in control of the coast from there north to Murmansk and in the following November French detachments occupied Odessa. These expeditions made little headway, for with the exception of the landowners, former officials and part of the Cossacks, the Russian people did not rally to their support as had been prophesied and expected. Insistent demands for their withdrawal were made not only by the Soviet authorities, but by individuals both in Europe and America. For example, in supporting his resolution in the United States Senate for the withdrawal of the American troops from Russian territory, Senator Hiram Johnson of California on January 29, 1919, characterized Allied intervention as a "miserable adventure," and Allied dealings with Russia as an "exhibition of the crassest stupidity." The Allied governments, although the target of much adverse criticism, and apparently realizing the failure of partial military intervention, nevertheless did not imme-

diately direct the withdrawal of their troops. In the opinion of the Entente diplomats the presence of these troops on Russian soil was a necessary adjunct to what appeared to them to be the one remaining method for the destruction of Bolshevism—the sanitary cordon.

IV. THE CORDON SANITAIRE

By means of hostile states and armies and a stringent blockade Russia was to be isolated and cleansed of her political leprosy. Already Allied forces held the gateway to the north, Czecho-Slovaks, Russian and Allied troops controlled the Trans-Siberian railroad eastward from Omsk, Turkestan and Trans-Caucasia were dominated by Cossacks and British troops, an Allied squadron in the Black sea supported French and Greek forces at Odessa, and the western front was to be barred by the buffer states of Ukraine, Roumania, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Esthonia. To the northwest Finland, no longer under German tutelage, was to form the connecting link in the chain of opposition. This "barbed wire fence" policy, as M. Clemenceau glibly termed it, was destined to be no more successful in accomplishing the desired end than had been the policies of opposition governments and partial military intervention.

1. *The Murmansk-Archangel link.* On the Murmansk-Archangel front the Allies and Russian White Guards, totaling approximately 15,000 men, were faced by a Bolshevik force of about 50,000. Outnumbered and under constant bombardment of the Red artillery, they were able to achieve but slight success. In an attempted offensive during March, 1919, they were easily driven back and their situation became so serious that on April 3 it was announced that only immediate reinforcements could prevent disaster. Just a week later Washington officially disclosed the fact that American forces in North Russia were discontented and had threatened a general mutiny. In June the American as well as the British detachments were withdrawn, their departure removing all danger of anti-Bolshevik aggressiveness on this particular front.

2. *The eastern barrier.* The situation on the eastern or Siberian front was of a very different character. On January 1, 1919, the Omsk government had an estimated fighting force of 300,000 including the Czecho-Slovaks under General Gaida as well as contingents of allied troops. Thanks to the Entente, it had an excellent base at Vladivostok and its line of communication, the Trans-Siberian railroad, was under the protection of Anglo-American-Japanese forces. Although it is impossible to state the exact strength of the Soviet armies opposing the all-Russian Siberian troops, it has been conservatively placed at not less than 1,200,000, a figure probably not over-estimated, inasmuch as the Lenine government sought to defend itself by the annihilation of its enemies through offensive tactics. During the months of January and February, 1919, little permanent progress was made by either army. By the end of March, however, the Kolchak forces had advanced to a line paralleling the Urals and running from Omsk northwestwardly beyond Perm. Further advance was also made during April and the early part of May when Kazau and Samara were occupied and Viatka taken. In an effort to protect his advance on Moscow, Kolchak using Viatka as a temporary base made desperate attempts to establish a connection with the Allied forces on the Archangel front. At this time unfortunately these troops were so hard pressed that they were unable to render assistance and as a partial consequence before the end of May the main Siberian armies encountered severe defeat, being forced to retreat from both the Kazau and Samara regions. Within the next two months they struggled desperately to regain their lost ground, but the Bolshevik forces succeeded in taking the important center of Ufa and capturing Perm. By the end of July the Siberian armies were hard pressed against the Urals.

Simultaneously radical revolutionary forces in Eastern Siberia carried on a guerilla warfare which constantly threatened communication with the rear. Late in the summer Kolchak was pushed out of European Russia, his position becoming so desperate that in August he issued a

proclamation appealing for assistance; after declaring that the destiny of Russia was at stake he exhorted every "peace loving person" vigilantly to defend it against disintegrating forces within and without; at the same time he endeavored to reorganize and reequip his demoralized and disheartened armies. Even the United States hurriedly shipped large quantities of arms and ammunitions which had been manufactured for the Kerensky government. Early in September he again assumed the offensive and by the end of the month had advanced along the entire front for a distance of from 75 to 100 miles. In the face of deadly counter attacks, however, he was unable to hold his line and was again forced to withdraw; so rapidly did the Bolshevik armies advance that by the end of October they were within striking distance of Omsk. In the mad scramble to get out of the Kolchak capital, carts, trucks, and unheated box-cars were pressed into service; by November 6 all the Allied missions, except the Japanese, had left the city. Although Kolchak resolved to defend his capital at all costs, it was occupied on November 15 by the victorious enemy, the Siberian troops retreating eastward in great disorder. This disastrous defeat virtually settled the fate of Kolchak and the Omsk government. It was officially reported that the Bolsheviks captured over 40,000 prisoners including 11 generals and 1000 lesser officers as well as 2000 machine guns, 4,000,000 rounds of ammunition, 30,000 uniforms, 75 locomotives, and 5000 carloads of supplies.

So closely did the Bolsheviks follow up this decisive victory that Kolchak had no opportunity to rally his disorganized army, and by mid-December he was in such desperate straights that he was reported ready to cede part of Siberia to Japan if the latter would come to his relief. It was too late, however, to save the day; the power and the authority of the Siberian dictator had crumbled away. Toward the end of December he retired as commander in chief of the all-Russian army, designating General Semenov as his successor. It was the last authoritative act of the "supreme ruler," for on February 7, he together with his former premier, Pepeliaev, were executed by direction of the Irkutsk revolutionary committee.

Kolchak's failure in Siberia is to be attributed in part to his terroristic methods, both military and civil. Under his régime the whole country was subjected to martial law. The zemstvos, the organs of local government, were reduced and restricted as in the days czardom; labor unions were suppressed and labor leaders banished; workers were forbidden to strike and were placed under military law. All civil liberties were practically obliterated; wholesale floggings and shootings were of daily occurrence. Especially severe was the administration of that part of Siberia east of Lake Baikal. Here General Horvath and his co-workers, Semenov and Kalmikov, were amazingly cruel. Not infrequently the whole population of a village was stripped and knouted; sixty workmen in a Chita workshop were flogged so severely that seven died. Kalmikov was publicly denounced by General Graves of the American Expeditionary Force as a bandit and a murderer. Further proof of the barbarity of the Kolchak régime was contained in a memorandum delivered by the Czecho-Slovaks to the Allied representatives at Vladivostok on November 15. In setting forth their reasons for desiring to quit Siberia they stated, among other things, that "the military authorities of the government of Omsk are permitting criminal actions that will stagger the entire world. The burning of villages, the murder of masses of peaceful inhabitants and the shooting of hundreds of persons of democratic convictions and also those only suspected of political disloyalty occurs daily." By such methods Kolchak instead of winning support won popular antagonism; instead of destroying Bolshevism he created it. Perhaps no better summary of the attitude of the people toward the Kolchak rule can be found than that expressed by the Siberian coöperative journal *Nashe Dyelo*.¹

¹ In the preparation of this article it has seemed unnecessary to add page documentation. The material has been drawn from a number of sources including *The New Europe*, *The New York Times Current History Magazine*, *Eastern Europe*, *Struggling Russia*, *Soviet Russia*, *The Independent*, *Nineteenth Century*, *The National Review*, *The London Times*, *The Manchester Guardian*, and the *British Parliamentary Journals*. I am under special obligation to the Editors of the *Political Science Quarterly* for the use of material which appeared in the September, 1919, issue of the *Record of Political Events*.

At first the Siberians rejoiced at their liberation from Bolshevism, but as time went on the people learned that peace and democracy seemed even further off. Six weeks after the clearing of Siberia the reactionary elements had completely strangled democracy . . . The rapidly monarchical element reappeared and below the discontent grew even more real.

The rule of Semenov, Kolchak's military successor, in the Trans-Baikal province, the only part of Siberia where a semblance of anti-Bolshevik authority still prevailed, was even worse than that of the Omsk government. Local administrative and economic institutions such as the zemstvos and coöperative unions have been summarily suppressed; gambling and profiteering were notoriously prevalent and robbery and brigandage were reported to be every day occurrences. Incidentally a close bond of friendship and mutual understanding seems to have existed between Semenov and the Japanese since the former came into prominence. Wherever and whenever possible Semenov has granted all sorts of concessions to the Japanese and they, in turn, while not officially representing Tokio, have aided him with arms, munitions and funds.

Even before the fall of Kolchak it was evident that as far as Siberia was concerned the sanitary cordon was breaking down. On December 8, for instance, the United States government, in reply to a note from Japan requesting whether the former proposed to maintain its *status quo* or to withdraw its troops either partially or entirely, or whether it was ready to send reinforcements, advised that it had decided to withdraw all its forces and leave the Russian people to work out their problems without further assistance or interference. Coincident with the withdrawal of the United States troops, the American railroad experts under John F. Stevens, who had been superintending the operation of the Trans-Siberian railroad, were also withdrawn. It was further announced in mid-January that the Czechoslovak troops whom the United States agreed to help consolidate and repatriate were virtually all concentrated in Eastern Siberia and that on February 1, 1920, ten thousand of them would embark for their homeland.

3. *The southern barriers.* Opposition to the Bolsheviks in South Russia centered in the Ukraine and in the trans-Caucasian country. With the withdrawal of the Germans from the former territory numerous claimants eagerly seized the opportunity to expropriate the soil of the Little Russians: the Poles seized Kholm and eastern Galicia; Roumanians with French sanction grabbed Bessarabia; the Turks claimed Crimea; the Cossacks under General Denikin, aided by the British, attacked on the east, and the Bolsheviks pushed down from the north, while French reinforced by Greeks and Sengalese occupied Odessa. The Ukrainians, opposed to all these claimants, rallied around General Petlura and Vladimir Vinnichenko, both members of the Social Democratic party. These leaders, although they had sufficient men, lacked money, officers and transportation experts; but their urgent appeals to the Allies met with no response. In March, 1919, Petlura was driven out of Kiev by the Bolsheviks, the French refusing to come to his assistance unless France should have complete military and industrial control of Ukraine for an "indefinite" period. The situation was not improved when it became known that the French were committed to support the Poles in their claim to Eastern Galicia where the population, with the exception of the city of Lemberg, is predominantly Ukrainian. Finally convinced that the British and French, especially the latter, intended to deprive them of their land and liberty and set up a reactionary régime, the Ukrainian peasants joined the ranks of the Bolsheviks.

Meanwhile the anti-Bolshevik leaders and their allied advisers were mapping out a plan of attack with Moscow as the objective. The Cossack generals, Denikin and Krassnov, were to mobilize their troops in the region between the Black and Caspian seas preparatory to advancing up the Don and Volga. On their right the Ural Cossacks were to effect a junction with the Orenburg Cossacks which were fighting with the left wing of the main Siberian army; to the west of the Denikin troops an Allied army was to push northward from Odessa. A general offensive launched in early April was most unsuccessful. The Franco-Grecian

army of 50,000, instead of pushing triumphantly northward and winning brilliant victories over the Bolsheviks and capturing Kiev, as was fictitiously reported, was decisively defeated, Odessa being abandoned on April 6. The French soldiers refused to exhibit any enthusiasm in this enterprise and the offensive virtually collapsed from within. By May 1 Kherson and Sevastopol were in the hands of the enemy. The Ural Cossacks were equally unsuccessful and together with their British allies were for the time being forced out of the valuable Trans-Caspian region. In the center the main army under Denikin was within the next two months almost surrounded by Trotsky's forces. Undiscouraged, Denikin reorganized his armies and in June with approximately 300,000 men he again launched an offensive in the hope of relieving the pressure on the Kolchak forces who, at this time, were being tumbled over the Urals by the aggressive Soviet troops. With the use of British tanks and artillery he succeeded in taking Kharkov, Tzaritsin, Bielgorod, and Ekaterinoslav, while Petlura, the Ukrainian chief, recovered Kiev. As a result of these sweeping victories Denikin counted 22,000 prisoners, 150 guns of heavy calibre, 350 machine guns, and an immense amount of other booty. Even more important, he gained control of the rich industrial basins of the Don and Volga. The success of his armies was largely neutralized, however, by the hostile attitude of the Caucasian population and by the menacing attacks of guerilla bands which threatened communication with the rear.

Notwithstanding these dangers Denikin prepared for a further advance by dividing his forces into three units: one, the western, was to advance in the direction of Kiev; another, the central division, was to move on Kursk and Orel; and the third, the eastern, was to push up the Volga to Kamishin. Meeting with no serious opposition from the enemy forces, he easily captured Voronezh and Grahskia on October 8; at the same time one of his trusted lieutenants, General Mamontov, with 13,000 Cossacks drove a deep wedge in the direction of Tambov, 250 miles southeast of Moscow. In the face of stubborn opposition his advance

gradually came to a halt and by mid-October he held a line extending from Kiev to Kharkov eastward along the Don to Tsaritsin. At this time a series of problems loomed up: the Bolsheviki after careful preparation began a general attack along the entire 700 mile front; on October 11 General Petlura, who had reached the conclusion that Denikin was a representative of reactionary monarchism, declared war on the counter-revolutionaries; the inhabitants of the Kuban districts were openly hostile; Astrakhan on the Black Sea at the mouth of the Volga had fallen under Bolshevik domination and his lines of communication were seriously menaced. Of all these problems the most serious was the Soviet offensive. With a fighting force variously estimated from 350,000 to 600,000, the Bolsheviki concentrated their attack on the Denikin center. After two weeks of desperate fighting their cavalry, on November 12, broke through on a 47-mile front between Orel and Kursk; in less than a week the central column of the Denikin army was practically annihilated. Throughout December the Soviet advance continued uninterruptedly, Kiev, Poltava, and Kharkov, the latter a strategic key of south Russia, falling into Bolshevik hands. Denikin strove desperately to halt the advancing army, but on January 1, 1920, they had captured Ekaterinoslav and were in possession of the Donetsk coal basin; while to the southeast they had cut a deep wedge into the Trans-Caspian territory. Before the month was over the anti-Bolshevik forces had been completely routed and the Denikin link in the sanitary cordon which a few months previously had given so much promise ended in a wretched *débâcle*.

4. *The buffer states.* One of the most interesting phases of the sanitary cordon policy was the attempt on the part of the Allied governments to hem in Soviet Russia on the west by means of buffer states. Russia having sinned against the "national idea," it was only natural, therefore, that the submerged nationalities of the Russian border provinces should seize the opportunity of civil war to reassert their independence. To the Entente powers these new states, especially Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania and

Ukraine, seemed to afford a means for establishing a barrier against the spread of Bolshevism westward as well as a base for military operations against the Lenine government.

At the outbreak of the Russian revolution the three Baltic provinces were completely dominated by a minority, the Baltic barons, who owned the greater portion of all the land in Esthonia and Latvia as well as a large part of the Lithuanian territory. Soon after the collapse of the czar's army the Germans overran Latvia and during the winter of 1918 they continued their advance into Esthonia where a Soviet republic had just been proclaimed; the Bolsheviks were soon expelled however, and the whole country placed under German military government. In the meantime, every effort was made by the baronial and junker element to hand the Baltic territories over to Berlin, the packed Balt assemblies, for instance, openly voting for union with Germany. This move was bitterly opposed by the non-German population of both the former Russian provinces, who, inspired by patriotic emotions and by the desire to be rid of landlordism, secretly organized National Councils, which blossomed forth as provisional governments as soon as the armistice with Germany had been concluded.

So cordially were the Germans hated and distrusted that even before hostilities terminated, an agrarian revolution occurred, the peasants boldly seizing the great estates and evicting their former owners, who in most instances fled to Berlin. Curiously enough, however, clause 12 of the armistice between the Allies and the Central Powers provided that all German imperial troops "at present in the territories which before the war formed part of Russia must likewise return to within the frontiers of Germany as above defined as soon as the Allies shall think the moment suitable, having regard to the internal situation of these territories." On the very day that the armistice was signed, Mr. Balfour of the British foreign office, in an official document expressed "the deepest sympathy" with "the aspiration of the Lettish people and its desire for liberation from the German yoke" and of Great Britain's "readiness to grant provisional recognition to the Lettish national council as a *de facto*

body." At the same time similar recognition was accorded the provisional government of Esthonia. This action on the part of the British government had the approval of the Allied diplomats, who in other words, proposed to use both the German troops and the Baltic states as an effective means of resistance to Bolshevism. The scheme at best was risky for the Germans evidently dreamed of subjugating the Baltic states and restoring the emigré barons to their land, while on the other hand, the Baltic patriot leaders were more keenly concerned with establishing their complete independence than being used as tools by the Entente. The young nations became, therefore, storm centers of three conflicting forces: Imperialism, Bolshevism and Nationalism.

With the withdrawal of the Germans from Esthonia in the fall of 1918, that country was promptly overrun by Soviet troops. Thoroughly frightened by the advance of the Bolsheviks, the Allies for the time being halted the further withdrawal of the Germans from the Baltic countries, at the same time helping the Esthonians to organize a counter-revolutionary offensive which succeeded in checking the invaders. In the meantime the Bolsheviks were advancing into Latvia and by the end of January, 1919, they had occupied Riga and Mitua and had reached the coast of Windau. With the tacit approval of the Allies the Germans now posing as enemies of Bolshevism, were to rid the country of the hated enemy. Quick to perceive the situation, General Von der Goltz, the German commander, assumed dictatorial power, full control of railroads, highways and telegraphs passing into his hands, German reinforcements were rushed into Latvia, and by the end of March, 1919, he had at his disposal an army of 20,000 German volunteers and 4500 Balt Landwehr for an offensive against the Bolsheviks. It was not long, however, before the real character of his mission became manifest. All attempts on the part of the Letts to raise a national army were stifled and in April the ministers and officials of the Lett government were either arrested or confined. Still fearing the Bolsheviks but alarmed by the imperialistic

ambitions of the Germans, the Allies now insisted that they withdraw, but it was not until near the end of November, 1919, and then only at the point of the bayonet, that the repeated requests of the Allies were complied with.

Meanwhile the Baltic states were tiring of constant war. For over a year they had been compelled to carry on an incessant struggle against both the Germans and the Bolsheviks. Then, too, the national leaders in the border states began seriously to consider what their situation, relative to Soviet Russia, would be upon the withdrawal of allied support; and in many quarters it was apparent that the people wanted peace. Efforts to this end assumed concrete form when at the invitation of Esthonia, a conference of the Baltic States was called at Riga in mid-September.

Just at this time, however, General Yudenitch, with the support of the Allied governments, was preparing for a drive on Petrograd, and strong pressure was brought to bear on the Baltic States, particularly Esthonia and Latvia to cooperate in the movement. Yudenitch, who had recognized the supremacy of Admiral Kolchak, as already noted, did not have the confidence of the government of either Esthonia or Latvia, and in fact both very frankly stated that if circumstances compelled them to choose between Yudenitch, Kolchak and the Lenine government, they would choose the latter. They were firmly convinced that Yudenitch, Denikin and Kolchak, even though all three had made very liberal proclamations on paper, were fighting the Bolsheviks for one, and only one fundamental purpose—the restoration of a strongly centralized monarchical government in Russia. Nevertheless, Esthonian and Lettish troops joined Yudenitch in a general offensive against Petrograd. After leading his forces to the gates of that city, the emigré general was driven back and his army so scattered that all hopes of the Allied governments for the capture of Petrograd vanished.

With the collapse of the Yudenitch offensive, the peace plans of the Baltic States were revived and on November 6 representatives of Esthonia left for Dorpat, where they

were joined by delegates representing Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Finland and the Ukraine, the last three being unofficial delegations. This conference was held apparently with the approval of the Allied powers, for even at this time certain of the Entente diplomats, including Mr. Lloyd-George, had come to the conclusion that the *Cordon Sanitaire* would not solve the Russian problem. After more than a month of negotiation, marked by numerous delays and interruptions, peace was practically concluded between Esthonia and the Soviet Republic on December 31, 1919. By the terms of the treaty, Soviet Russia recognizes "without reservation the independence of the Esthonian state and freely abdicates for all time, all the sovereign rights which belonged to Russia with respect to Esthonia's land and people in accordance with former state orders, as well as those rights given under international treaties. Esthonian land and peoples shall have no obligations whatever with respect to Russia because of the former connections of Esthonia and Russia." Latvia soon followed the example of her northern neighbor and at the time this article is written Poland and Lithuania are talking peace with the express consent of the Allies. Even Great Britain, it would appear, has abandoned the idea of a "ring of fire" and is now ready to conclude peace with the Soviet government. These facts go far to prove, if not to explain, the dismal failure of the *Cordon Sanitaire*.

V. CONCLUSION

In a word, the policy pursued by the Allies toward Russia from the overthrow of the czarist régime to the recent lifting of the Allied blockade, was founded on fear and distrust. The Entente diplomats failed to perceive the psychological temperament of the Russian people; they failed to understand that the Russian masses were struggling in an effort to find their way out of the meshes of czardom. They persisted for over two years in adhering to a policy which at best netted a maximum of irritation and a minimum of effect—in other words a policy which served only to con-

solidate Bolshevik resistance and to prolong civil war. In supporting Yudenitch, Kolchak and Denikin, all three of whom in the eyes of the Russian masses, were apostles of reaction and monarchism, the Entente simply strengthened the opposition. Rather than eat bread with a Protopopoff or receive salt from the hands of a Pobêdonostsev, the peasantry, proletariat and even the bourgeoisie chose to rally round the standard of Lenine. If the world has learned any lesson from the failure of the Allied program let us hope that it is that so aptly expressed in the noble words of General Smuts:

Russia can only be saved internally by Russians themselves, working on Russian methods and ideas. . . . Our military forces, our lavish contributions of tanks, and other war material may temporarily bolster up the one side, but the real magnitude of the problem is quite beyond such expedients. . . . It may well be that the only ultimate hope for Russia is a sobered, purified, Soviet system and that may be far better than the tsarism to which our present policy seems inevitably tending.